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P
-values are the most frequently employed metric to assess the significance of stat-
istical findings in the social sciences. Since the earliest years of their usage the
meaning and usefulness of P -values were topics of heated discussion (Fisher
1935; Berkson 1942). Lately the reproduction/replication crisis resuscitated this debate (Gel-
man 2018; Benjamin et al. 2018; Lakens et al. 2018; McShane et al. 2017; Trafimow and Marks
2015; Nuzzo 2014). Meanwhile, the skepticism has not stopped at the gates of political science.
Most prominently the journal “Political Analysis” banned P -values “in regression tables or
elsewhere” after the new editor took over the board of editors in 2017 (Gill 2018: 1).1 Also
political scientists contributed to a swelling debate suggesting to lower the threshold for P -
values to 0.005 (Benjamin et al. 2018; Esarey 2017).
This special issue seeks to contribute to the debate on P -values by summarizing the main
arguments of it, providing an encompassing discussion of P -values – also from an epistemolo-
gical perspective – as well as advice for the discipline about the Do’s and Don’ts for P -values.
In February 2018 the Department of Political Science at the University of Zurich invited sev-
eral political methodologists to discuss the matter in a series of public lectures. The present
contribution summarizes these public lectures but also goes beyond them by presenting the
arguments two other distinguished colleagues.
Our introductory piece summarizes the discussion around P -values in the discipline and
situates this into the larger debate on the replication crisis; Justin Esarey discusses what null
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1Only to back-pedal later on and deciding to allow P -values in specific cases.
hypothesis testing means for social sciences in general as well as for the P -value debate;
Susumu Shikano provides a detailed insight into how Bayesian inference fails and merits of
Bayesian inference in addressing the P -value crisis; Marco Steenbergen takes an epistemolo-
gical view on toP or not toP ; Vera Tröger talks about the use ofP -values from an econometric
perspective; Simon Hug’s contribution finally synthesizes our debate.
So, what are P -values and why do we as researchers care so much about them? P -values
date back to the 18th century where Pierre Simon-Laplace came-upwith first ad hoc definitions
ofP -values. Later on in the 20th century Pearson formalized them in hisχ2 test and then Fisher
popularized them by also proposing the threshold of 0.05 for statistical significance. The first
references from Fisher on the threshold of 0.05 stems from his well-known “lady testing tea”
experiment. Muriel Bristol, a phycologist and enthusiastic tea drinker, claimed to be able to
differentiate tea which was poured on milk from milk which was poured on tea – of course
keeping the amount of tea and milk constant.
Fisher and his friendWilliam Roach decided to test Bristol’s tea tasting skills with a simple
experiment: Muriel Bristol was provided eight cups of tea (four prepared by first adding milk;
four prepared by first adding tea). Bristol then was asked to name the four cups prepared
by her be-liked method. Thus, the null hypothesis was that Burial did not have the ability to
distinguish the preparation of tea. Given n=8 cups and k=4 chosen cups the experiment results
in 70 possible combinations.2 In order to reject the null hypothesis Fisher suggested that Bristol
needed to get four out of four cups right. The combination of four correctly classified cups has
a chance to occur in one out of 70 combinations. Bristol eventually got all eight cups correct.
Fisher discusses the threshold of 5 % in close relation to the lady testing tea experiment. As
outlined above Bristol’s performance had a chance to occur in only 1.4 per cent, while if she
had missed only a single cup the chances to observe such a performance would have increased










such a performance just by chance was too high. Future research built on Fisher’s reasoning
and eventually stopped discussing the reasons for the 5 % threshold entirely. As this example
illustrates, what P -values then really tell us is how likely our data are, assuming that our H0
(Bristol not having the skills to tell the difference between the two tea preparation methods) is
true (Wasserstein and Lazar 2016). A standard for empirical testing was born and until today
this standard guides social scientists’ behavior, evaluations of research and most prominently
publication standards.
But why have researchers recently ‘seen the light’ and payed attention to the shortcomings
of P -values? In 2011, the renowned social-psychologist Diederik Stapel was found guilty of
fraudulent research practices.4 As it turned out Stapel had faked his entire data collection. He
simply answered to his questionnaires himself and thereby created the data he and his research
team then analyzed. His research fraud sparked a larger debate within psychology: To what
extend was there a culture of “sloppy” science, in which some scientists did not understand the
essentials of statistics, reviewers for journals encouraged researchers to leave unwelcome data
out of their papers, and even the most prestigious journals printed results that were obviously
too good to be true?5 The Open Science Collaboration (2015) replicated 100 studies published
in psychology journals. Using high-powered designs, they found that their mean effect size
was approximately half of the size of the original articles. Moreover, while 97% of the original
studies had demonstrated significant results (p < 0.05), only 47% of the replicated studies
had significant results – indicating that 53% of the studies could not be replicated. This is not
only a problem of psychology, where the norm is to publish based on experimental studies.
In economics, also half of the studies could not be replicated (Chang and Li 2015). Chang
and Li (2015) replicate 67 original articles published in 13 well-regarded macro-economics and
general interest economic journals and demonstrate that replication issues are not tied to using
experimental data, but equally apply to studies using publicly available data sets. In political
science the debate caught fire with the Mike LaCour case. LaCour did not only follow “sloppy”
research practices but committed fraud by inventing data he never had collected in the first




These happenings suggest that practices of ‘P -hacking’ are more likely to occur in an en-
vironment focusing so much on the question of whether P < 0.05. They are then amplified
by the human tendencies of apophenia - seeing patterns in random data - and of conformation
bias - focusing on evidence that is in line with our (favored) explanation. These human tend-
encies are likely to affect howwe walk through the ‘garden of forking paths’ when conducting
analysis (Gelman and Loken 2013) and how we interact with the question of ‘researcher de-
grees of freedom’ (Simmons, Nelson, and Simonsohn 2011). And in many instances making
the threshold is just one tiny step away – e.g. by adding/dropping a control, an interaction
term or dropping some unfavorable outliers.
Thus, from our point of view not only the practices of how we engage and interpret P -
values need to change, but eventually the environment under which we conduct research
needs to adapt as well. Lowering the threshold for significance is unlikely to achieve this goal
(Benjamin et al. 2018). A design-based derivation of the threshold might be better-equipped to
achieve this goal (Lakens et al. 2018), but similar to the issue of the ‘garden of forking paths’
leaves researchers potentially with too many ‘degrees of freedom’. Proposals calling for a
purely Bayesian approach to questions of significance tend to ignore that eventually we will
run in very similar questions and issues irrespective if we choose a Bayesian or Frequentist
perspective.
Instead, we understand the replication/reproduction crisis as a symptom for a larger, sys-
tematic problem in the Social Sciences. This problem speaks to all aspects of what we are as
a profession. It speaks to: how we teach empirical research practices, how we engage with
changing practices in data sciences and how we question our own past and present behavior
as scientists. But most importantly it suggests that no matter how we engage with P -values
in the future as a profession, proposals for change need to take into account howmuch public-
ation pressures, publication and review practices will affect proposed reforms to engage with
P .
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